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Resumo
A Segurança Europeia  “às Avessas”
A existência de uma separação entre segurança ex-
terna e interna cessou de existir. Os efeitos de pro-
pagação de conflitos e da instabilidade em áreas 
como o Sahel e o Médio Oriente são sentidos na 
Europa. No presente e no futuro o crime organiza-
do, o terrorismo, a emigração ilegal e os ciberata-
ques constituem uma preocupação de segurança, 
enquanto as ameaças militares - exceto no que 
respeita ao emprego de mísseis – desapareceram. 
Contudo, não existe uma resposta integrada a estes 
problemas de segurança por falta de interesse das 
nações e da UE. Continuam a existir estratégias, 
estruturas e acordos separados no plano externo 
(PCSD, Relações Externas e Defesa) e no plano dos 
atores internos de segurança (Justiça e Assuntos 
Internos – JAI). Uma exceção reside no desenvolvi-
mento de capacidades, onde as comunidades civil e 
militar coordenam crescentemente programas, em 
particular no setor aéreo e espacial.
Com o propósito de ultrapassar a clivagem inter-
na-externa, a UE terá que tomar medidas práticas: 
elaborar uma verdadeira Estratégia de Segurança 
Integrada articulando o domínio da PCSD com o 
da JAI; desenvolvimento holístico de capacidades 
e emprego de capacidades civis-militares em áreas 
como transporte, reconhecimento e comunicações; 
integração de sistemas de vigilância marítima civil 
e militar entre outras.
Sem a liderança dos EUA, a Europa terá que as-
sumir mais responsabilidades pela sua segurança. 
A força militar sendo necessária passará a fazer 
parte de um esforço mais amplo, colaborando com 
atores civis dentro e fora da Europa.
Abstract
The separation of external and internal security belongs 
to the past. The spill-over effects of conflicts and insta-
bility in areas like the Sahel and the Middle East can be 
felt inside Europe. Today and tomorrow, international 
crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and cyber attacks 
are major security concerns, while classic military threa-
ts – except for missiles – have disappeared into the back-
ground. However, an integrated response to these wider 
security interest is lacking, often by nations but certain-
ly at the level of the European Union. Separated strate-
gies, structures and arrangements continue to exist for 
the ‘external’ (CSDP, Foreign Affairs & Defence) and 
the ‘internal’ security actors (Justice and Home Affairs, 
JHA). A positive exception is capability development, 
where civil and military user communities increasingly 
are coordinating their programmes, in particular in the 
air and space sectors.
To overcome the external-internal security gap, the EU 
has to take practical steps: the elaboration of an Integra-
ted Security Strategy for real coordinated action by the 
CSDP and JHA actors; comprehensive capability deve-
lopment and the use of civil-military capacities in areas 
like transport, reconnaissance and communications; in-
tegrating maritime surveillance data exchange between 
civil and military users, and other practical aspects of 
cooperation. 
Europe’s security is upside down, inside out. Without 
the natural leadership of the United States, Europe will 
have to take more responsibility for its own security. Mi-
litary forces will still be needed, but increasingly they 
will become part of a wider effort, closely working to-
gether with civilian actors, outside and inside Europe. 
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Introduction
Four decades long security was measured by numbers of tanks, fighter aircraft and 
frigates of the opposing East and West. Then the Berlin Wall fell. Out-of-area be-
came the new fashion. Armed forces had to become more deployable, flexible and 
mobile to restore peace and stability in troubled regions elsewhere in the world. 
At 9/11 the United States was attacked at its own territory for the first time since 
Pearl Harbour. Instability and conflict in countries far away suddenly had a direct 
impact on security at home. Washington launched a new crusade to strike at the 
root of evil. Asymmetric warfare and counter-insurgency popped up as the key 
characteristics of armed conflict at the beginning of the 21st century. In the meanti-
me the Arab Spring developed into a stormy and thundery season, spreading over 
the Middle East and into the Sahel area. An arc of instability now stretches from 
the Caribbean through Northern Africa into the Middle and Near East. It is routing 
drugs trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism and international crime to Europe. 
At the same time, Europe’s trade and energy flows remain vulnerable to interrup-
tion, along African coasts or due to potential trouble in rising conflict zones such 
as in East Asia. 
Security has become more complex and is increasingly multidimensional. Non
-state actors have joined the scene and are likely to stay. Globalisation and the 
world-wide web have helped to increase dependencies, but at the same time they 
have made our economies, institutions and infrastructure more vulnerable. Clas-
sic military threats still exist. Proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass des-
truction is likely to continue, though the risk of their actual use by states seems 
to be rather small. Terrorists, religious fanatics or other extremists pose a bigger 
threat to our security. Their prime targets are civilians, but deployed forces in 
conflict zones like Mali are also at risk. But contrary to the past, most of the threa-
ts and challenges that can disrupt Europe’s modern societies are of a predomi-
nantly non-military nature: pirate attacks at key sea passages; illegal immigrants 
crossing the Mediterranean and the Black Sea; cross-border crime and trafficking 
in human beings, arms and drugs; cyber-attacks which are taking place nearly 
every day and, last but not least, natural disasters most of which are related to 
climate change.  
In a nutshell, Europe’s security is less predictable than during the days of the East- 
-West stalemate and its immediate aftermath. Furthermore, the threat was outsi-
de, while today and tomorrow security risks and challenges manifest themselves 
also inside Europe. External and internal security are closely interwoven. This ar-
ticle will look at the responses of the European Union and its member states to 
the changing security environment. Are the right strategies and policies in place? 
What about instruments and capacities to handle the risks and challenges posed to 
European security? Which role should European armed forces play in the changing 
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environment? In short, how should the European Union manage security in the 
post-Post Cold War era?1
The Impact of Terrorism
In the 1990s Europe had witnessed the collapse of Yugoslavia, followed by armed 
conflict, violation of human rights and genocide. Due to intervention by the United 
States – using NATO as the organisation for armed action – the Bosnian war and 
Kosovo crisis could be brought to an end, at least as armed fighting was concerned. 
The political leaders of France and the United Kingdom had the Balkan wars very 
much in mind when they agreed at St. Malo in December 1998 that the European 
Union should be able to deploy autonomously military forces to end armed conflict 
in its own backyard. A year later, at the EU Helsinki Summit, a Headline Goal of a 
European intervention force of 60,000 military was agreed – very close to the ori-
ginal size of KFOR, NATO’s land force deployed to Kosovo in 1998. Consequently, 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – formally launched in 2000 at 
the EU Cologne Summit – focussed on crisis management in conflict areas external 
to the European Union. A civilian element was added in order to allow for de-
ployment of police, judges and other civilian personnel together with the military 
– a proven requirement during the stabilisation phases after the end of the Balkan 
wars. Territorial defence was left to NATO.
ESDP had barely taken off when Bin Laden struck at the Twin Towers in New York 
and the Pentagon in Washington DC at 9/11 2001. Soon after President George Bush 
declared the ‘War on Terrorism’. European countries were divided on supporting the 
American approach. However, the new threat of transnational terrorism with root 
causes in unstable areas in the Middle East and Central Asia could not be neglected. 
The train and metro bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) made clear that 
Europe’s interior was targeted as well. ‘Terrorism doesn’t recognise borders’ became 
a frequently used one liner, expressing that external and internal security no longer 
could be separated. In the first semester of 2002 the Spanish Presidency tried to in-
corporate the fight against terrorism in the list of ESDP types of operations. Madrid 
failed to generate consensus in the Council (De Vries, 2008: 356). The initiative wate-
red down to the definition of ‘the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism’ with 
hardly any real action undertaken. Equally, the European Council’s 2004 ‘Solidarity 
Declaration against terrorism’ – according to which EU member states should assist 
each other after an attack inside the EU – remained a commitment on paper without 
practical implementation. A few years later the first EU Counter-Terrorism Coordina-
tor concluded that “Counter-terrorism has not been main streamed into the civilian 
1  The role of NATO is not addressed in this article.
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and military crisis management missions of the Union”. He also stated: “Presidency 
efforts to promote cross-Pillar synergies in the Council, notably between Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, have been less 
than consistent.” (De Vries, 2008: 371-372). Early efforts to connect external and inter-
nal security tools and measures failed.
Security Strategies
European Security Strategy
At the end of 2003 the European Union’s first security strategy was published. The 
European Security Strategy (ESS) stated that “The post Cold War environment is one 
of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security 
are indissolubly linked.” Key threats to Europe’s security were no longer limited to 
external conflicts and state failure – the focus of ESDP – but included, amongst others, 
terrorism and organised crime. With regard to the latter the ESS stated: “This internal 
threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking 
in drugs, women, illegal immigrants and weapons form a large part of the activities 
of criminal gangs.” The Union’s response had to consist of a mixture of instruments, 
to be deployed in a more coherent manner (Council of the European Union, 2003). 
But in reality hardly any action was taken. Five years later the ESS update drew the 
conclusion that “We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal 
and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are nee-
ded across different agencies, at national and European level. (..) Progress has been 
slow and incomplete.” In the meantime new threats had emerged. Cyber security, 
energy security and climate change were added to the list of threats and challenges to 
Europe’s security interests (Council of the European Union, 2008).
Internal Security Strategy
Almost a decade after ESDP was launched the EU continued to separate the exter-
nal and internal aspects of security. This separation was further reinforced with the 
Council’s adoption of the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in February 2010. The ISS 
described the challenges, the principles and the guidelines for how to deal with in-
ternal security issues in the EU. It focussed on better coordination of the various ac-
tivities in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area.2 Five priority areas were identi-
fied: international criminal networks, terrorism, cyber security, border security and 
disasters. The ISS mentions the linkage with external security, in particular how the 
EU’s external policies, operations and missions can contribute to internal security, 
2  The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduced the term “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” 
(AFSJ), but the acronym JHA continues to be used. 
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for example by reinforcing institutional, social and economic development and by 
assisting in building up effective rule of law structures in third countries. It argues 
for cooperation with the CSDP3 actors. The ISS defines itself “as an indispensable 
complement to the European Security Strategy” (Council of the European Union, 
2010a). The text leaves no doubt that internal and external security measures and 
instruments serve the same overall purpose. However, the ISS only steers the acti-
vities of the JHA actors. Indeed, it complements the ESS but without an overarching 
framework. Since 2010, the European Union has two security strategies in place. 
Towards Integrated Security
Over the past few years many ideas have been launched for elaborating a new 
European Security Strategy, first and foremost by think tanks. The project for a 
European Global Strategy (Fagerstern, 2013) had the support of the Italian, Polish, 
Spanish and Swedish governments, representing a minority of EU member states. 
The Brussels actors thus knew they had to skate on thin ice. In her CSDP report 
of October 2013 High Representative (HR) Catherine Ashton pointed to the chan-
ging strategic context. She referred to a world which “as a whole faces increased 
volatility, complexity and uncertainty.” It is characterised by “a multipolar and in-
terconnected international system (which) is changing the nature of power. The 
distinction between internal and external security is breaking down.” (European 
Defence Agency, 2013). Yet, the HR did not propose to draft a new security strategy 
for the European Union. Neither did President Van Rompuy when preparing the 
December 2013 European Council meeting on security and defence. Why? Because 
they knew all too well that the topic would drive the member states apart instead of 
uniting them. EU capitals agree on the main aspects of the changing security envi-
ronment, but they are divided on the global role the Union should play in response. 
The two extreme sides are still represented by France – favouring an increased role 
of the EU in the world, including with military means – and the United Kingdom 
opposing that position. Under the Cameron Government the UK has distanced it-
self even further away from defence cooperation in the EU. France has recognised 
that the elaboration of a new security strategy (or the creation of a European mi-
litary headquarters) is a bridge too far for the moment. Thus, Paris did not press 
Ashton and Van Rompuy to propose the launch of a new ESS.
However, the Conclusions of the December 2013 European Council contain a for-
mula which could be interpreted as the starting point of writing a new security 
strategy. The HR has been tasked “to assess the impact of changes in the global 
environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges 
3  With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 Dec. 2009) the term European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) was replaced by Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
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and opportunities arising for the Union” (European Council, 2013). In the short 
term not much will happen as 2014 will be the year of change for all top positions 
in the EU. In the course of 2015 – also depending on the outcome of the British na-
tional elections – perhaps it will be possible to propose a new EU security strategy. 
What should it be? Preferably, an overarching strategy providing the umbrella over 
all sectorial security policies and activities. The EU needs an Integrated Security 
Strategy, which (1) defines Europe’s role in the world based on the 21st century 
geostrategic environment, (2) addresses the consequences for external and internal 
security as a concerted effort and (3) provides the overall guidelines for all EU ac-
tors in view of coherent and consistent implementation. This will be very difficult 
to realise as European countries have diverging views on such a visionary security 
strategy, but doing nothing is no option either in a rapidly changing world. 
Using the Lisbon Treaty
A new security strategy for the European Union will not see the daylight before 
mid-2015. In the meantime the Lisbon Treaty is bringing innovation in external ma-
tters. The function of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice-Presidency 
of the European Commission, supported by the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), has been created to bring more coherence and effectiveness in the EU’s 
external action. The Horn of Africa is showing the progress made with instruments 
deployed in a more coordinated way, from civil and military CSDP crisis manage-
ment capacities to humanitarian assistance, development aid and financial support 
by the European Commission. The comprehensive approach is becoming reality, thou-
gh many political, bureaucratic, juridical and financial obstacles will continue to 
block the road to even more comprehensiveness.
Solidarity Clause
The potential in the Lisbon Treaty to overcome the external-internal security gap, at 
least in some specific areas, has not been used so far. The Solidarity Clause (art. 222, 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union-TFEU) contains the most explicit 
reference to combine tools and assets which so far had been separated for external 
and internal security use. Article 222 states that the Union and its member states 
“shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist 
attack or natural or manmade disaster.” Furthermore, it stipulates that “The Union 
shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources 
made available by the Member States (..).” This is a clear legal reference that Union 
capacities and military assets of member states can be deployed together for in-
ternal security purposes. The Common Security and Defence Policy section even 
incorporates a mutual defence clause (art. 42-7 Treaty European Union-TEU), whi-
ch obliges member states to provide aid and assistance “by all the means in their 
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power” to a member state which is the victim of major aggression. This article does 
not replace collective defence through NATO (which is specifically mentioned in 
art. 42-8). In other words, the mutual defence clause is not related to pre-designed 
territorial defence arrangements but rather obliges member states to assist each 
other after an attack has taken place. 
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force at the end of December 2009. It took three 
years before the High Representative and the European Commission forwarded a 
joint proposal on the arrangements for the implementation of the Solidarity Clau-
se (Council of the European Union, 2012). The proposal defines the geographic 
scope, the activation mechanism and the response arrangements at the Union 
level. The Clause applies to disasters and terrorist attacks within EU territory, 
whether on land, sea or in the air. In this context it refers explicitly to ships (when 
in international waters), airplanes (when in international airspace) or critical in-
frastructure (such as off-shore oil and gas installations) under the jurisdiction of 
a member state. The Clause applies irrespective of whether the crisis originates 
inside or outside the EU. Member states can activate the Clause, but supposedly 
they will only take such an initiative in exceptional circumstances and when their 
own capacities are insufficient. When asked for assistance the High Represen-
tative and the Commission will propose a response package. This package can 
consist of Union crisis response instruments and, if needed, additional measu-
res by member states for which a Council decision will be needed. If military 
support is required a separate proposal will be forwarded to the Council, based 
on the relevant Treaty provisions. Starting in 2015 the Commission and the High 
Representative will produce a joint integrated threat and risk assessment report, 
building “on assessments of threats, hazards and risks currently compiled in va-
rious sectors (such as terrorism, organised crime, civil protection, health, climate 
change and environment).” These reports will be the basis for regular assessment 
by the European Council.  
The joint proposal leaves the impression that the Solidarity Clause is an option of 
last resort, only to be used when a member state comes to the conclusion that its own 
means are not sufficient to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack or a ma-
jor disaster. The text makes no reference to the potential scope and scale of member 
states’ contributions when called for. Treaty language to ‘act jointly’ and to ‘assist’ 
one another seems to have disappeared into the background. The option of offering 
military assistance is almost neglected. One can also wonder how complicated and 
time-consuming Council decision-making relates to the urgency of delivering assis-
tance. Therefore, it seems likely that member states – in case of immediately needed 
assistance – will proceed outside the context of the Solidarity Clause.
The proposal is fully in line with the principle of subsidiarity, but the question is 
whether that principle can always be applied in case of disaster or terrorist atta-
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ck.4 Naturally, in many cases of small-scale hazards or terrorist acts national assets 
will suffice. On the other hand, large-scale disasters – such as flooding of extensive 
areas or severe earthquakes and terrorist bombing involving for example chemical 
weapons or (dirty) nuclear material – might require immediate international assis-
tance. In particular, this will apply to smaller countries with limited national assets. 
Military assistance will be urgently needed when CBRN5 material is involved in an 
accident or attack – calling in specialised defence capacities. The same might apply 
to destruction of critical infrastructure – calling in engineering capacities of the mi-
litary. Military reconnaissance planes or transport helicopters might become critical 
assets in cases of large-scale flooding or severe earthquakes. 
When the founding fathers of the Treaty Text’s Solidarity Clause will see the Cou-
ncil decision – assuming it will not deviate too much from the proposed text when 
adopted – they will be disappointed. An opportunity might be missed to create new 
international security arrangements which are absent at the moment. The Solida-
rity Clause fills a gap, not covered by article 5 of the NATO Treaty nor by the EU’s 
mutual defence clause nor by bilateral or regional security arrangements, as all of 
these are based on traditional military threats. Even more, the risks to European 
security covered by the Solidarity Clause are the most likely ones. Yet, the member 
states show reluctance to use the full potential of the relevant Treaty article. 
Common Funding
The Lisbon Treaty also opens avenues of allocating the Union budget for military 
purposes, for example for defence research and technology. According to article 
185 (TFEU) “the Union may make provision, in agreement with the Member States 
concerned, for participation in research and development programmes undertaken 
by several Member States, including participation in the structures created for the 
execution of those programmes.” 
Not the European Commission but the European Defence Agency (EDA) took the 
initiative to explore the potential of article 185. Its campaign in 2010 failed. In parti-
cular the influential legal experts in the European Commission opposed the activa-
tion of the article. In their view civilian-driven and military research had to be kept 
4  The EU already has a Civil Protection Mechanism in place that can be activated by any partici-
pating state seeking prompt international assistance following a major disaster that overwhel-
ms national civil protection capacities. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), 
located at the European Commission in Brussels, acts as the hub for communications, infor-
mation-sharing and coordination. The Mechanism can also be activated for use in countries 
external to the EU. The ERCC handles about 20 emergencies each year (such as large-scale 
forest fires and flooding). 
5  Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.
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strictly apart in order to reflect the separation of communitarian and intergovern-
mental responsibilities. A practical solution was found in the European Framework 
Cooperation (EFC) for research and technology. The EFC was aimed at synchro-
nising research and technology investment, not at joint programmes. Technology 
projects run by the EDA could be coordinated with security research financed by 
the Union under the 7th Framework Programme6 and with the European Space 
Agency as the third EFC partner. This coordination of dual-use technology invest-
ment should prevent duplication and waste of money. Defence ministers tasked 
EDA to develop EFC programmes in the areas of CBRN protection, unmanned air-
craft systems and situational awareness. In the CBRN area an EFC programme is 
up and running. 
In the course of 2013 the European Commission changed its position. The Com-
mission’s own contribution to the December European Council included a pro-
posal to co-fund research projects of member states in dual-use technologies (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013). The new research programme Horizon 2020 – with a 
financial content of approximately € 80 billion – can be used for jointly funded 
technology development, leaving the EFC formula of synchronising dual-use re-
search with the defence sector untouched. The co-funding proposal, which has 
been supported by the European Council, is a breakthrough. Not only bureau-
cratic and legal resistance inside the Commission but also political opposition of 
some member states fearing further communitarisation of defence matters has 
been overcome.
Civil-Military Capacities
One area where considerable progress has been made for bridging the external-in-
ternal security gap is capability development. The initiative to connect military ca-
pability requirements to those of civilian users was taken by EDA soon after its 
operational start in 2005. As EDA is part of the EU family of institutions and as the 
European Commission is represented in the Agency’s Steering Board the links with 
the civil side could easily be constructed. For projects in capability areas like com-
munications, satellite observation, reconnaissance and transport, civil and military 
requirements were brought together, not in common programmes but to ensure 
that future military and civil systems will be interoperable and standardised. Two 
areas stand out as the frontrunners of civil-military capability development: air and 
space.
6  The Framework Programmes stimulate technology research and development in the EU. FP 7 
covered the period 2008-2013 and had a total financial volume of € 50.5 billion (part of which 
has been dedicated to “security research”).
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Air
The focus of EU civil-military cooperation for air assets is on drones or, by their 
official title, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). The use of drones has grown 
tremendously over the last few years, in particular by the United States both in mi-
litary missions and for homeland security purposes. The American-Mexican border 
is being surveyed by drones on a 24/7 basis. In Europe, civil and military authori-
ties are operating drones of different sizes, weight and coverage. The smallest are 
launched by hand, the largest are the Medium-Altitude Long Endurance-Unman-
ned Aerial Vehicles (MALE-UAV). The French and the British armed forces operate 
MALE-UAV systems; Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are acquiring the capa-
bility. Currently all MALE-UAVs operated by European countries are American 
(Reaper). European industries like EADS, BAe Systems, Dassault, Finmeccanica and 
Saab are all involved in the development of the next generation MALE-UAVs, be it 
at the moment on separate tracks. 
In December 2013 the European Council has blessed the development of a Eu-
ropean MALE-RPAS in the 2020-2025 timeframe. Hopefully, this guideline will 
prevent duplication of efforts and waste of money, which resulted in the past in 
three different modern European fighter aircraft (Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale). Fur-
thermore, both military and civil user communities should be brought together in 
defining requirements. The EU border control agency Frontex will most probably 
use MALE-UAVs for monitoring the extensive Schengen area borders and to assist 
member states in intercepting illegal immigrants. One can also envisage civil use of 
drones in case of disasters like large-area flooding, forest fires or earthquakes, when 
access on the ground is limited or impossible. The European Commission, EDA and 
other agencies are involved in programmes for the insertion of RPAS in civilian air 
traffic.7 The Commission is working on required legal regulations, the European 
Air Safety Agency on measures and certification procedures and EDA on ‘sense 
and avoid’ technology which will allow a UAV to ‘feel’ other aircraft and to ‘steer’ 
its course to prevent a collision. EDA and ESA have a common project on using 
satellite links for flying RPAS in non-segregated airspace.8 RPAS insertion into civi-
lian airspace is also connected to the European Commission’s Single European Sky 
project, which envisages to replace the current air space control corridors in Europe 
7  Currently, MALE-UAVs cannot fly in civilian airspace, unless planned far in advance to reduce 
the risk of collision. 
8  The DeSIRE project (Demonstration of Satellites enabling the Insertion of RPAS in Europe). 
A test flight took place in April 2013. In February 2014 both agencies agreed on the DeSIRE II 
project, which will demonstrate that services, such as environment and maritime surveillance 
applications, cab be rendered with RPAS flying beyond radio line of sight through the use of 
safe and secure satellite-based command and control data links. See www.eda.europa.eu 
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under national control to a European-wide single sky in which both civilian and 
military aircraft can fly. This requires investment to replace the current technology 
connecting aircraft and ground control station which dates back to the 1950s. The 
dedicated project – Single European Sky Air traffic management Research (SESAR) 
– has a financial envelope of € 2.1 billion, financed by the EU, Eurocontrol and 
industry (each one third). 
Space
Space technology development and the acquisition of space assets and services are 
mainly driven by civil-user communities. In satellite communications commercial 
companies dominate the market (some 80%). The resolution of satellite imagery 
available on the open market would have been labelled ’top secret’ a few decades 
ago. Large countries still have dedicated military satellites for communications and 
observation, but their technology is often a spin-off from civilian and commercially 
driven space technology. However, space assets are expensive. This has also driven 
timely attempts to seek civil-military synergies. Already in 2007 the European Spa-
ce Policy recognised the role of space-based services for (civilian) security and (mi-
litary) defence actors as a priority. In 2010 the ‘Structured Dialogue on Space and 
Security’ was launched, bringing together the European Commission, the Euro-
pean External Action Service, the Council Secretariat, EDA and the ESA (European 
Defence Agency, 2011). In 2008 EDA and the ESA set up informal staff contacts and 
in 2011 both organisations signed a formal cooperation agreement.9 
Another area of civil-military linkage is earth observation by satellites. From its 
start the earth-observation programme GMES, launched by the European Com-
mission, had security mentioned as one of its objectives.10 Over time GMES usage 
has been expanded to areas like maritime surveillance, border control and support 
to EU external actions. Also, the scope for providers has been widened: “Although 
GMES is a programme solely for civilian use, it is important to identify how exis-
ting dual-use observation resources – i.e. both civilian and military – can contribu-
te to the GMES programme, for example, for the systematic surveillance of large 
geographical areas or the tactical surveillance of smaller areas.” (European Com-
mission, 2011). The military MUSIS project is of particular importance.11 Under its 
9  The European Space Agency (ESA) is not an EU institution. In June 2011 the EDA and the ESA 
concluded an Administrative Arrangement which allows for a (formal) cooperation partnership. 
10  The GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) programme aims at optimising 
the use of satellite earth observation capacities for civilian users. GMES is also known as the 
Copernicus project.
11  MUSIS (Multinational Space-Based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Ob-
servation) is a military project under the aegis of EDA in which four European countries with 
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security applications GMES is available in support of border control and maritime 
surveillance, but also for crisis and conflict management under the EU’s external 
action.12
The Galileo project is another example of a civil-users driven capability which can 
be to the benefit of the military. Galileo will provide Europe with its own global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS), independent from the American Global Positio-
ning System (GPS). Four of the sixteen Galileo satellites are now in orbit. An initial 
operational capability will be available by 2016. Galileo remains a civil-users driven 
programme, but interest for both military and non-military use of the encrypted 
Public Regulated Signal (PRS) appears to be growing (Gibbons, 2012). Some Euro-
pean countries like France most likely will use the PRS signal for their armed forces. 
Others such as the United Kingdom prefer continued use of the military regulated 
code (M-code) of the United States’ GPS. 
Satellite communications has been specifically mentioned in the December 2013 
European Council Conclusions. The next generation of governmental satellite 
communication will be closely coordinated between member states, the European 
Commission and ESA. 
Towards Comprehensive Capability Development 
The European Commission, EDA and ESA have stepped up their practical coope-
ration on capability development from a project-driven basis to a more structural 
approach. The EU and its member states are moving in the direction of a com-
prehensive capability development as the civil and military communities are brou-
ght together more systematically. 
Contrary to the comprehensive approach for (external) crisis management, com-
prehensive capability development takes into account the internal security needs. 
The European Commission has already entered the zone of dual-use capabilities. In 
its July 2013 Communication the Commission refers to its ongoing work “on non-
military capability needs supporting both internal and external security policies, 
such as civil protection, crisis management, cyber security, protection of external 
borders and maritime surveillance.” In this context the Commission has suggested 
to produce a joint assessment with the EEAS of dual-use capability needs for EU 
security and defence. On the basis of the assessment the Commission would “come 
up with a proposal for which capability needs, if any, could be best fulfilled by as-
sets directly purchased, owned and operated by the Union.” In fact, EU actors such 
military satellite observation capacities (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) together with Bel-
gium, Greece and Poland cooperate in order to harmonise the needs for the next generation 
(post 2018) military observation satellites.
12  See www.copernicus.eu
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as ECHO13 already operate own transport aircraft. Clearly, there is scope for capa-
bilities in other areas like reconnaissance, medical and others which could be used 
by civilian and military actors. Pooling & sharing could be extended from a purely 
defence to a civil-military concept in areas of overlapping capacities. Unfortunately, 
countries like the UK have opposed the approval of the Commission’s proposal, 
more driven by political motives than by common sense. Pooling & sharing the 
same capabilities between the military and civilian security actors will avoid du-
plication, save money and optimise standardisation and interoperability. A ‘win
-win-win’ situation. At its December 2013 meeting the European Council has not 
supported the Commission’s proposal, but neither has it been blocked. Most likely, 
the European Commission will explore the scope for purchasing, owning and ope-
rating own (dual-use) capacities. Again, practice will go ahead of policy which has 
proven to be the best way forward in the past.
Maritime Security: a Specific Case
The EU considers maritime security as a matter which is part neither of external 
security nor of internal security. In fact, it runs across all dimensions of security and 
safety, including economic and environmental interests. The EU coastline is about 
90,000 kilometres long. Five regional sea basins surround the European continent: 
the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
The EU is dependent on seas and waterways for approximately 90% of its external 
trade and over 40% of its internal trade. Maritime security is also crucial for energy 
production and transport, tourism, fisheries and, all taken together, for the welfare 
of Europe’s citizens.
However, maritime security is challenged by a wide variety of threats and challen-
ges, from climate change and pollution to piracy, smuggling and illegal immigra-
tion. Classic military threats – opposing naval forces – are barely present anymore 
close to Europe. But the increase of naval power by emerging countries in Asia 
and the conflict potential in the Western Pacific may impact trade and energy sea 
transport on which Europe remains highly dependent. A study conducted in 2013 
for the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence identifies six 
emerging challenges to the global maritime system: 
(1) failed and collapsed states in the EU neighbourhood: indeed, one can witness 
an increasing number of disfunctioning states, in particular in Northern Afri-
ca and in the Middle East;
13  European Communities Humanitarian Office. The European Commission’s service for deli-
vering humanitarian aid. In recent years ECHO delivered humanitarian aid worth €1 billion 
annually on average. 
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(2) international terrorism: despite the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan extre-
me radicalism seems to flourish and is even spreading across Syria and coun-
tries in Northern Africa, close to Europe’s southern and south-eastern borders;
(3) piracy: after several years of naval operations and other EU missions on land 
piracy seems to be disappearing near the Horn of Africa, but is increasing 
rapidly in other parts of the world and most noticeable in the waters adjacent 
to Western Africa;
(4) illegal immigration: figures speak for themselves – tens of thousands immi-
grants tried to reach EU territory last year, mainly across water in the Me-
diterranean and by land and sea to Greece and Bulgaria; sometimes these 
immigration flows included hidden extremists connected to terrorist groups;
(5) transnational crime: there is an increase of activities of criminal networks whi-
ch are using instability in failed states and in regions such as the Sahel; major 
drugs trafficking routes now run from northern Latin America through North 
Africa to Europe; for human trafficking the Maghreb offers the springboard 
to the European continent;
(6) environmental security risks: this is a particular concern in the maritime area 
due to the devastating effects pollution can have to the quality of the sea wa-
ter and in coastal areas (relevant for fisheries, tourism and other important 
activities).
The list shows how maritime security has to be defined in terms of broader security 
interests, which impact strategy and practical measures. 
EU Maritime Security Strategy 
Threats and security risks were not taken on board in the EU Integrated Maritime 
Policy (IMP) which the European Commission presented in 2007. It provided the 
framework for the development of maritime sectors such as transport, fisheries, 
tourism and infrastructure, including ports (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2007). In subsequent years, when discussing implementation, the impor-
tance of the naval contribution to maritime security was recognised but it was not 
integrated into the policy for the simple reason that defence remained outside the 
IMP’s scope. After the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force the Council invited 
“the High Representative, together with the Commission and the Member States, 
to undertake work with a view to preparing options for the possible elaboration of 
a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain (..).” (Council of the European 
Union, 2010). The vague formula was a last minute compromise, reflecting the turf 
battle between the Commission and the newly created EEAS about who would 
have the prime responsibility for drafting an EU Maritime Security Strategy. That 
battle of competences – also present between various ministries in EU capitals – 
would block any substantial progress on follow-on work for more than three years. 
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In the second half of 2013 the High Representative, the Commission and the mem-
ber states agreed a deadline for concluding the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EU 
MSS), which was blessed by the European Council in December 2013. According 
to the text the EU MSS will be based on a Joint Communication from the European 
Commission and the High Representative which includes CSDP “within a holistic, 
cross-sectorial and EU-values driven approach, taking into account Member States’ 
contributions and achievements, to enable improved coordination in this field.” 
The EU MSS should be adopted by the Council in June 2014. Action plans have to 
be proposed before the end of 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2013).
As maritime security has to be seen as a mixture of external and internal security 
interests and as it is crucial for the European citizens’ economic and social welfare, 
it should contain at least the following elements:
• its application has to be global, as the interests as well as the risks and challen-
ges have a world-wide reach;
• its approach has to be civil-military, bringing together external and internal po-
licies and instruments; 
• its participation has to be comprehensive, involving all relevant civilian and mili-
tary actors across the traditional external-internal security divide; 
• its governance should be based on legal responsibilities, with the appropriate 
authority for member states in their coastal waters and exclusive economic 
zones;
• its structure has to be integrated to the extent possible in terms of operational 
instruments, civil and military;
• its capabilities will require planning coordination between all ministries in-
volved and at the EU level between the CSDP, maritime policy and internal 
security actors, including the relevant EU agencies.
Once the EU MSS has been adopted by Council action plans should be made cove-
ring specific areas of practical cooperation. 
Maritime Surveillance Data Exchange
The most important area of realising a cross-sectorial civil-military approach is 
maritime surveillance information exchange – simply because maritime securi-
ty is highly dependent on such data. Because of stove-piped approaches in the 
past there exists today a multitude of information exchange networks. Navies, 
fisheries, environmental agencies, customs, police, port authorities and the trans-
port sector – very often they communicate data in stand-alone networks which 
are also separated across national borders. According to research conducted by 
the European Commission there are about 400 public authorities across Europe 
responsible for maritime surveillance data exchange, handled by 20 different sys-
tems. As data exchange between the different user communities is limited, some 
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40 to 90 percent of the information is not yet made available to all of them. The 
consequences are easy to predict: none of the actors has a complete picture, ac-
tions by the relevant authorities remain often uncoordinated and taxpayer’s mo-
ney is wasted by overlapping investment in radars, ships or surveillance aircraft 
(European Commission 2012).
Equally, there is a multitude of national and multinational pilots, projects and ini-
tiatives for connecting different maritime surveillance data networks. Since 2009 
the European Commission is working on the establishment of a Common Informa-
tion Sharing Environment (CISE), which should be operational by 2020. In the CISE 
context pilot projects have been conducted in the Baltic area and the Mediterra-
nean. EDA has developed a Marsur network, which was tested in 2011 by six parti-
cipating countries (Finland, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK). A year later, 
other EU coastal states and Norway joined the six originators in a project aimed at 
further developing the technical elements required to use the Marsur network in 
a fully operational context. In the course of 2014 the network should reach its ope-
rational phase. Examples of existing efforts are the Sea Surveillance Co-operation 
Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic-Centre in Rome for 
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. At the European level EMSA – the European 
Maritime Safety Agency, located in Lisbon – has several data exchange networks in 
place for vessel tracking. SeaSafeNet distributes information on vessel movements 
gathered from coastal stations able to pick up signals from ships equipped with Au-
tomatic Identification System (AIS) responders. EMSA has also constructed the EU 
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system, which makes use of satellite 
information. It allows for vessel tracking beyond Europe’s immediate surrounding 
waters and it is connected to a world-wide LRIT system under the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). Thetis is the third element of EMSA’s vessel tracking 
system, exchanging data that can help port authorities to target their inspections. 
The Lisbon Agency aims to integrate the three parts into an Integrated Maritime 
Data Environment (IMDATE). Finally, EMSA has developed CleanSeaNet, an oil 
slick detection system which uses satellite imagery and, when required, surveillan-
ce aircraft or ships of the member states for on-the-spot checks. 
The challenge is now to connect all these data exchange networks into one overar-
ching network. As the EDA Wise Pen Team of five retired admirals concluded in 
2010, this is not so much a technological challenge but an issue of mind-set. The ma-
jor requirement – according to the admirals – is to change mentality from a “need to 
know” to a “need to share” attitude (The Wise Pen Team, 2010). This principle has 
also been accepted in the CISE context. On several occasions the Council has en-
dorsed the aim of connecting already existing networks instead of building a com-
pletely new structure. EMSA has already proven to serve as the hub for maritime 
surveillance data exchange across Europe. It has also created the Marsurv-1 system 
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for exchanging maritime surveillance data with the EU naval anti-piracy opera-
tion Atalanta and vice versa. This proves that EMSA can be connected to mariti-
me surveillance information networks of European navies - even with secure data 
handling restrictions. But Marsurv-1 has been the exception, based on an ad hoc 
decision. The Council would have to take a specific decision to allow for structural 
maritime surveillance data exchange between EMSA and the navies. This brings 
the matter back from the practical level to the political strategic level.
Other Practical Cooperation Potential
In many other areas practical cooperation between the different civil and military 
maritime security actors could be enhanced. European navies, now contributing to 
operations of the EU border control agency Frontex on an ad hoc basis, could coor-
dinate the availability of assets, for example in stand-by readiness rotation roos-
ters like they exist for EU Battlegroups. European coastal states could also increase 
their bilateral and regional defence cooperation to step up integration for maritime 
security purposes. One could imagine civil and military maritime patrol aircraft 
being pooled for areas like the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Approaches 
and the Mediterranean. For air policing several countries (the Baltic States, Island) 
are dependent on other countries’ air forces flying to protect and monitor their air 
space. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have agreed to integrate air poli-
cing. In the future, on rotation Belgian and Dutch F16s will cover the whole Benelux 
air space. If such far-reaching cooperation models are already under construction 
for air policing, comparable integration should be possible for maritime surveillan-
ce by air assets. 
In some cases national law or regulations will have to be adjusted, but this should 
not be used as an argument to do nothing. The Dutch coastguard is a civil-mili-
tary mixed organisation and relays maritime surveillance data from all available 
sources, including the law enforcement ministries and agencies. An underlying 
information-sharing protocol has been signed by all participating ministries, in-
cluding Defence. The Dutch case proves that legal barriers can be overcome to sha-
re information between civil and military actors. The experience could be used to 
further increase cooperation between national coast guards, to start with between 
countries bordering the same sea areas. Naturally, this should include search and 
rescue services.
Way Forward
Europe’s security is upside down, inside out. Crime, terrorism and illegal immigra-
tion are the major challenges today, not the threat of massive armed force. Internal 
security is directly related to instability and conflict in the European neighbourhood 
and beyond. The comprehensive approach for EU external crisis management in 
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the Sahel and elsewhere has to be integrated with the activities inside the Union 
to counter spill-over effects stemming from such conflict zones. Currently, this is 
not the case as the external and internal actors, both in EU capitals and in Brussels, 
continue to operate along separate tracks.  
In December 2013 the European Council has called for “increased synergies be-
tween CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors to tackle horizontal issues such 
as illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism.” (European Council, 2013). 
Cyber and maritime security have also been mentioned as priority areas. In reali-
ty, the EU has separated strategies, structures and arrangements for ‘the external’ 
and ‘the interior’, reflecting the existing legal division of responsibilities between 
the EU’s intergovernmental and communitarian institutions. In many EU capitals 
stove-piped approaches of the Foreign Affairs and Defence ministries on the one 
hand, and of the Justice and Home Affairs ministries on the other hand continue 
to exist. These legal and bureaucratic nuts are hard to crack. Therefore, a step-by
-step approach is more likely to succeed than a giant leap forward through Treaty 
change. What should happen? On strategy, the European Council tasking to assess 
the impact of changes in the global environment for the Union should be used to 
merge the European Security Strategy and the Internal Security Strategy into an 
Integrated Security Strategy. It has to provide clear guidelines for tuning policies, 
tools and instruments of the CSDP and Justice and Home Affairs actors in order 
to maximise their effect. Integrated security requires from the military to support 
civil internal security actors, not only at the national level but also at the level of EU 
agencies like Frontex, EMSA and others. Vice versa the JHA sector should be more 
closely and more structurally engaged in external action. Combined meetings of 
diplomats, experts or even ministers are welcome but more is needed to realise this 
objective. Regional EU strategies, such as for the Sahel, have to be done commonly. 
The planning and conduct of operations and other activities of CSDP and JHA ac-
tors have to be brought together in order to ensure consistency and effectiveness of 
both external and internal security objectives.
Successful national models of government-wide, civil-military coordination or 
even integration should be used at the EU level. Legal barriers, such as for mari-
time surveillance information exchange, should be slashed by dedicated Council 
decisions, not by ambitious Treaty change. Practical civil-military cooperation in 
dual-use technologies should be expanded. The Commission’s offer on co-funding 
dual-use defence research by groups of member states should be turned into reality 
as soon as possible. Pooling and sharing needs to become a civil-military matter for 
dual-use capabilities and assets like satellites, drones and transport aircraft. The 
comprehensive approach in operations has to be applied to capabilities as well. 
Europe has entered a new era. Without guaranteed American leadership in a wor-
ld where the geostrategic focus is moving in the direction of Asia, Europe will be 
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forced to take more responsibilities for safeguarding its own security. Armed forces 
will still be needed, but the external-internal security nexus has to be taken into 
account. Europe’s armies, navies and air forces will increasingly have to operate 
with civilian actors, not only in Africa or elsewhere but also at home in support of 
wider security interests.
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